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A.: Recent Statutes of Rule-Making Power of Courts
WEST FIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

requiring the court to hear any such case if both parties
so demanded. The avowed idea of the present bill is to
give the proposed change a trial without forcing it in all
cases.
The chief objection raised by the opponents of this
change is that it will overwork the courts. To this the proponents answer that any court conscientiously reading the
voluminous records now presented is required to do more
work than would be required if the cases were heard before it with opportunity then and there to rule upon the
eNidence. There is another answer to this objection. If
the chancery deposition is outmoded it should be abolished,
no matter what the immediate result. If the state must
take care of it by the appointment of additional judges, or
if it may be taken care of by references to a master in certain cases, as was suggested at the 1926 meeting, those are
matters of detail. It is not believed that any serious congestion will follow even if open hearings are made compulsory. Such congestion has not followed in other states.
The Bar Association has gone on record. This is hardly
half the battle. If the association is in earnest, doubtless
legislation will follow. The trial should be given. There
can be very little doubt that it will prove satisfactory in
more ways than one. It will eliminate most of the delay;
it will very substantially decrease the cost; it will give to
the court the opportunity of observing the witnesses on the
stand; it will remove a strong deterrent to potential litigants, who, if they are intelligent, frequently refuse to
prosecute matters in chancery unless their importance
compels such prosecution.
This is only a step in advance but it is a step. It is to be
hoped that it will lead to our complete emancipation from
a form of procedure discarded over half a century ago by
the courts which originated it.
-J.

H. BRENNAN.

RECENT STATUTES ON RULE-MAKING POWER OF COURTS.-

In 1925 tvo statutes of general interest to the bar were
passed, one in Delaware and one in Washington. The
Delaware Statute reads in part as follows:
"The Chief Justice and Associate Judges of the State
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of Delaware shall have power to prescribe and establish
by general rules the process, writs, pleadings, verifications, motions and forms of action, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law and in the rendition,
whether at or during the first term or otherwise, entry,
opening or vacating of judgments and orders therein.
Said rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six
months after their promulgation. Upon becoming effective, all laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect. The said Judges shall have power, from time to time, to supplement, abridge, modify, or
amend such rules.
"In all cases where by statute special forms of action,
pleading or practice are prescribed for the enforcement
of civil rights or titles, the process, writs, pleadings, verifications, motions and forms of action, and the practice
procedure, judgments and orders so prescribed by said
general rules, shall be followed in lieu of the forms of
action, pleading and practice so prescribed by statute."
The Washington Statute is very similar in its effect.
"The Supeme Court shall have the power to prescribe,
from time to time, the forms of writs and all other process, the mode and manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings; of giving notice and serving
writs and process of all kinds; of taking and obtaining
evidence; of drawing up, entering and enrolling orders
and judgments; and generally to regulate and prescribe
by rule the forms for and the kind and character of the
entire pleading, practice and procedure to be used in all
suits, actions, appeals and proceedings of whatever nature by the Supreme Court, Superior Courts and Justices
of the Peace of the State of Washington. In prescribing
such rules the Supreme Court shall have regard to the
simplification of the system of pleading, practice, and
procedure in said courts to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits.
"When and as the rules of courts herein authorized
shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall
be and become of no further force or effect.
"This act shall not be construed to deprive the Superior Courts of power to establish rules for the government
supplementary to and not in conflict with the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court."
Both of the statutes embody the full authority of the
courts to make their own rules of procedure, superseding
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,all legislative enactments in conflict therewith. In neither
Washington nor Delaware however, has there been time to
formulate a set of rules of procedure and the power is as
yet unexercised to any great extent. In Delaware at a
meeting of the bar association this year the unanimous conclusion was reached that a new set of rules should be
adopted following the model set of rules of the American
Judicature Society.
In Washington the bench and bar have been very cautious and the passage of the act has made very little difference in procedure.
Statutes conferring similar powers in Colorado in 1913
have been so cautiously regarded by the courts there that
few changes have been effected.
Few states allow a court to override the acts of the legislature, but in all of them the power of the court to make
rules exists to a greater or less extent. That power, except
in the cases of a few specialized courts, such as the Chicago
Municipal Court, and many governmental administrative
courts, has not been exercised. Courts have preferred and
even taken active steps to shift the responsibility to the
legislature. Whether the reason for this has been that the
legislature offers a convenient body to receive criticism if
rules of procedure prove cumbersome or whether courts
have preferred to trust to superior wisdom of legislators in
procedural matters where they felt they needed a guide
does not appear from the record. The fact remains that the
rule-making power has not been exercised by courts generally even to the limited extent as it now exists.
In the last ten years however, there has been an increasing agitation among responsible lawyers and judges for the
establishment of a complete rule-making power in state
and federal courts. A committee of the American Bar Association, composed of Josiah Marvel, Roscoe Pound, Charles
S. Cutting, Frank W. Grinnell, E. W. Hinton, Charles S.
Cushing, Thomas W. Shelton and Edson R. Sunderland, is
nov enthusiastically endorsing this movement and is
conducting active propaganda in its favor. This fall they
have issued a pamphlet which is just off the press, containing the statutes, decisions and opinions of lawyers on
the practice in the exercise of the rule-making power in
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every state in the union. The pamphlet is thorough and
well worth study.
For the benefit of those who have not followed the discussion of the rule-making power of courts, a short statement might be of interest.
The proposal, in its broadest terms, contemplates the.
substitution of court rules for legislative codes of practice
and procedure. Procedural law-is divided into two classes,
(1) What the courts may do, (2) How they may do it.
The first class includes jurisdiction and general procedure.
iThe second, all rules of practice directing the manner of
bringing parties into court and the method by which the court
proceeds thereafter.
The first is to be a matter of legislative enactment.
The second is to be provided for in court rules.
This proposal would not eliminate codes of civil procedure, but would cut down their application to jurisdictional
matters, rules of evidence and rules of substantive law.
The chief objections urged to regulation of procedure
by rules of court are as follows: (1) It would require the
enactment of a new code of procedure which in turn would
require judicial construction and would plunge us into a
condition of uncertainty which it would require years to
remove. (2) That the procedure today is not in any serious
need of reform and that this is an attempt to tinker with a
system which works well enough as it is. These are the
chief objections on the ground of policy. Other objections
applying to specific states are that the rule-making power
might be unconstitutional.
The argument of the protagonists for this proposal may
be summed up as follows:
(1) Rules of procedure should be made by experts instead of by legislative bodies that know nothing about the
subject.
(2) The power of the court to make rules which would
override statutes in matters of procedure, would create
great elasticity and tend toward accomplishing the following things,
(a) Uniformity of procedure over the United States
through the interchange bf ideas through the bench and
bar.
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(b) The elimination of delay in changing a procedure or
rule which does not fit.
(c) An increasing sense of responsibility of courts which
sense of responsibility has been destroyed by their lack of
power to make their own rules.
(3) It is contended in answer to the argument that confusion would result from the change, that the proposal has
been tried in England since 1875 with the result that the
English procedure today is far superior to ours; that it has
also been tried in Canada, Australia, Ireland and British
India. It has also been the uniform rule of Congress wherever new courts have been established to allow these courts
to also establish their own procedure. Examples are the
Court of Claims,, the United States Court of China, the
Court of Customs and Appeals, the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Board of Tax Appeals and other similar bodies.
In West Virginia the statutes are as follows:
"Form of writs.-The Supreme Court of Appeals
may, from time to time, prescribe the forms of writs and
other process, and make general regulations for the practice in such court. (Acts 1872-3, c. 9.) Barnes' W. Va.
Code 1923, c. 114, 3.
"Courts have inherent power and authority to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for the conduct
of their business and in accordance with established
procedure, not inconsistent with organic or statutory law,
nor unreasonable, oppressive or obstructive of common
right. Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454 (1920) ."
Section 4, Chapter 51 of the proposed new Code of West
Virginia provides as follows:
"Regulation of Pleading, Practice and Procedure in
All Courts of Record Except County Courts.-The supreme court of appeals may, from time to time, make and
promulgate general rules and regulations governing
pleading, practice and procedure in such court and in
all other courts of record of this State, civil and criminal,
except county courts. Such rules and regulations shall
not be inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes nf
this State, and shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade or class. (Code 1849, c. 161, 4; Code 1860, c. 161,
4; Code 1868, c. 114, 3; 1872-3, c. 9, 3; Code 1923, c.
114, 3.)"
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This is a very cautious start toward the rule-making
power. It leaves the legislature supreme in matters of procedure and leaves a very limited field for the Supreme
Court. It creates a similar situation to that existing in a
majority of states in most of which the courts have either
declined or neglected to exercise such narrow powers.
There appears to have been up to the present time little
interest in the bar in extending this power of the Courts.
However, the question is becoming of increasing importance
and interest and deserves discussion in this state. We
quote therefore the following letter received from Judge
Josiah Marvel, the guest of honor at the last Bar Association meeting:
"Thurman Arnold Esq., Dean,
Morgantown, W. Va.
Dear Sir:
"Some time during the year I will hope for your cooperation in forwarding the Rule Making Power of the
Courts in your State. The plan that we are suggesting
to the Presidents of the various Bar Associations in the
various States is along the following lines:
"1. That they consider the subject and bring in a report in -favor of the Rule Making Power of the Courts
being granted by the Legislature at the next meeting of
the State Bar Association.
"2. That they induce the President of every local Bar
Association in the State to appoint a similar committee
for a similar end.
"3. That they use every opportunity to induce the
press to favor the proposal and if some news item looking to the appointment of a committee or otherwise is
given to the press at the same time, it can be induced to
include the arguments in favor of the Committee as a part
of the news story.
"I look forward with confidence to your helpfulness in
carrying the subject forward in your State.
Very truly yours,
Josiah Marvel."
-T.
W. A.
WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION-THE

PRESIDENT'S AD-

DRESs.-There are certain portions in the address of Nelson
C. Hubbard, past president of the West Virginia Bar Association, at the last meeting which deserve more than
customary burial in the bound volume of the Bar Associa-
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